The aim of this paper is to prove coding theorems for the wiretap channel and secret key agreement based on the the notion of a hash property for an ensemble of functions. These theorems imply that codes using sparse matrices can achieve the optimal rate. Furthermore, fixed-rate universal coding theorems for a wiretap channel and a secret key agreement are also proved.
The secret key agreement from correlated source outputs using sparse matrices is studied in [15] [16] , where both non-universal and universal codes are considered. Our construction is the same as that proposed in [16] .
It should be noted that the linearity of functions is not assumed in our proof of reliability and security while it is assumed in [16] . Furthermore, an expurgated ensemble of sparse matrices is not assumed in our proof while it is assumed in [16] .
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
Throughout this paper, we use the following definitions and notations.
The cardinality of a set U is denoted by |U|, U c denotes the compliment of U, and U \ V ≡ U ∩ V c .
Column vectors and sequences are denoted in boldface. Let Au denote a value taken by a function A : U n → U at u ≡ (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ U n , where U n is a domain of the function. It should be noted that A may be nonlinear. When A is a linear function expressed by an l × n matrix, we assume that U is a finite field and the range of functions is defined by U ≡ U l . It should be noted that this assumption is not essential for general (nonlinear) functions because discussion is not changed if l log |U| is replaced by log |U |. For a set A of functions, let ImA be defined as
ImA ≡ A∈A {Au : u ∈ U n }.
We define sets C A (c) In the context of linear codes, C A (c) is call a coset determined by c.
Let p and p ′ be probability distributions and let q and q ′ be conditional probability distributions. Then entropy H(p), conditional entropy H(q|p), divergence D(p p ′ ), and conditional divergence D(′ |p) are defined as
where we assume the base 2 of the logarithm.
Let µ UV be the joint probability distribution of random variables U and V . Let µ U and µ V be the respective marginal distributions and µ U|V be the conditional probability distribution. Then the entropy H(U ), the conditional entropy H(U |V ), and the mutual information I(U ; V ) of random variables are defined as
H(U |V ) ≡ H(µ U|V |µ V )
I(U ; V ) ≡ H(U ) − H(U |V ).
Let ν u and ν u|v be defined as
We call ν u a type of u ∈ U n and ν u|v a conditional type. Let U ≡ ν U be the type of a sequence and U |V ≡ ν U|V be the conditional type of a sequence given a sequence of type U . Then a set of typical sequences T U and a set of conditionally typical sequences T U|V (v) are defined as
The empirical entropy, the empirical conditional entropy, and empirical mutual information are defined as
I(u; v) ≡ H(u) − H(u|v).
A set of typical sequences T U,γ and a set of conditionally typical sequences T U|V,γ (v) are defined as
We use several lemmas for the method of the types described in Appendix. April 12, 2010 DRAFT In the construction of codes, we use a minimum-divergence encoder g AB B (c, m, w) ≡ arg min
a maximum-likelihood decoder g A (c|y) ≡ arg max
and a minimum-entropy decoder g A (c|y) ≡ arg min
H(x ′ |y).
The minimum-divergence encoder assigns a message to a typical sequence as close as possible to the input distribution, where the typical sequence is in the coset determined by c. The time complexity of encoding and decoding is exponential with respect to the block length by using the exhaustive search. It should be noted that the linear programming method introduced [9] and [5] can be applied to these encoder and decoders by assuming that X = Y = GF(2) and A, B, and B are linear functions, where the linear programming method may not find the integral solution. Details are described in Section VIII. It should be noted here that we do not discuss the performance of the linear programming methods in this paper.
We define χ(·) as
Finally, we use the following definitions in Appendix. For γ, γ ′ > 0, we define
It should be noted here that the product set U × V is denoted by UV when it appears in the subscript of these functions. We define h(θ) for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 as
We define | · | + as
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III. (α, β)-HASH PROPERTY
In the following, we review the notion of the hash property for an ensemble of functions, which is introduced in [18] . This provides a sufficient condition for coding theorems, where the linearity of functions is not assumed.
We prove coding theorems based on this notion.
be a sequence of sets such that A n is a set of functions A :
For a probability distribution p A,n on A n , we call a sequence (A,
and
for any T , T ′ ⊂ U n . Throughout this paper, we omit dependence of A, p A , α A and β A on n.
In the following, we present two examples of ensembles that have a hash property.
Example 1:
In this example, we consider a universal class of hash functions introduced in [8] . A set A of functions A : U n → U A is called a universal class of hash functions if
For example, the set of all functions on U n and the set of all linear functions A : U n → U lA are classes of universal hash functions (see [8] ). When A is a universal class of hash functions and p A is the uniform distribution on A, we have
This implies that (A, p A ) has a (1, 0)-hash property, where 1(n) ≡ 1 and 0(n) ≡ 0 for every n.
Example 2:
In this example, we consider a set of linear functions A : U n → U lA . It was discussed in the above example that the uniform distribution on the set of all linear functions has a (1, 0)-hash property. In the following, we introduce the ensemble of q-ary sparse matrices proposed in [18] . Let U ≡ GF(q) and l A ≡ nR for given 0 < R < 1. We generate an l A × n matrix A with the following procedure, where at most τ random nonzero elements are introduced in every row.
1)
Start from an all-zero matrix.
2) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, repeat the following procedure τ times: a) Choose (j, a) ∈ {1, . . . , l A } × GF(q) uniformly at random. b) Add a to the (j, i) component of A. In the following, let A be a set of functions A : U n → U A and assume that p C is the uniform distribution on ImA, and random variables A and C are mutually independent, that is,
for any A and c. We have the following lemmas, where it is not necessary to assume the linearity of functions.
Lemma 1 ([18, Lemma 1]):
If (A, p A ) satisfies (H4), then p A ({A : [G \ {u}] ∩ C A (Au) = ∅}) ≤ |G|α A |ImA| + β A for all G ⊂ U n and all u ∈ U n .
Lemma 2 ([18, Lemma 2]):
Finally, we consider the independent joint ensemble p AB of linear matrices. The following lemma asserts that it is sufficient to assume the hash property of (A, p A ) and (B, p B ) to satisfy the hash property of (A×B, p AB )
when they are ensembles of linear matrices.
Lemma 3 ([18, Lemma 7]):
For two ensembles (A, p A ) and (B, p B ), of l A × n and l B × n linear matrices, respectively, let p AB be the joint distribution defined as
Then (A × B, p AB ) has an (α AB , β AB )-hash property for the ensemble of functions A ⊕ B :
where
IV. WIRETAP CHANNEL CODING
In this section we consider the wiretap channel coding problem illustrated in Fig. 1 , where no common message and perfect secrecy are assumed. A wiretap channel is characterized by the conditional probability distribution µ Y Z|X , where X, Y , and Z are random variables corresponding to the channel input of a sender, the channel output of a legitimate receiver and the channel output of an eavesdropper. Then the capacity 1 of 1 It is stated in [20] that the auxiliary random variable can be eliminated by applying [10, Theorem 7] and [11, Theorem 3] . In fact, because of the authors misunderstanding about the result of [11, Theorem 3] , the statement of [20] may not be true. They wish to thank Prof. Shamai (Shitz), Prof. Oohama, and Prof. Koga, for helpful discussions. 
where the maximum is taken over all probability distribution µ XX and the joint distribution µ XXY Z is given
If a channel between X and Y is more capable than a channel between X and Z, that is,
is satisfied for every input X, then the capacity of this channel is simplified as
where the maximum is taken over all random variables X and the joint distribution of random variable (X, Y, Z)
is given by
This capacity formula is derived in [23] for a degraded broadcast channel, extended in [7] to the case where a channel between X and Y is more capable than a channel between X and Z.
In the following, we assume that µ X and µ Y Z|X are given, where it is not necessary to assume that a channel is degraded or a channel between X and Y is more capable than that between X and Z. We fix functions
April 12, 2010 DRAFT and a vector c ∈ X lA available for an encoder, a decoder, and an eavesdropper, where
We construct a stochastic encoder and assume that the encoder uses a random sequence w ∈ X l B , which is generated uniformly at random and independently of the channel and the message m ∈ X lB . We define the encoder and the decoder
where g AB B (c, m, w) and g A (c|y) are defined by (1) and (2), respectively. It is noted that g AB B is a deterministic map.
Let M and W be random variables corresponding to m and w, respectively, where the probability distributions p M and p W are given by
and the joint distribution p MW Y Z of the messages, and the channel outputs is given by
The rate of this code is given by 
The information leakage Leakage Z|X (A, B, B, c) is given by
It should be noted that the vector c is considered to be part of a deterministic map, which is known by the eavesdropper.
We have the following theorem. It should be noted that alphabets X and Y is allowed to be non-binary, and the channel is allowed to be asymmetric, non-degraded.
Theorem 1:
Let µ Y Z|X be the conditional probability distribution of a stationary memoryless channel. For given l A and l B , assume that ensembles (A, p A ), (A × B, p AB ), and (A × B × B, p AB B ) have a hash property.
Then for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, there are ε B > ε A > 0, functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B ∈ B, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
By assuming that the channel between X and Y is more capable than that between X and Z, µ X attains the secrecy capacity defined by (12) , and δ → 0, the rate of the proposed code is close to the secrecy capacity.
For a general wiretap channel µ Y Z|X , let F : X → X be a channel (non-deterministic map) corresponding to a conditional probability distribution µ X| X and assume that
achieves the maximum of the right hand side of (10) . By using a proposed code for the channel µ Y Z| X defined as
with the input distribution µ X , we construct a code for the channel µ Y Z|X as
and g A (c|y) reproduces x with small error probability. Then the rate of this code is close to the secrecy capacity of the channel µ Y Z|X defined by (10).
V. UNIVERSAL WIRETAP CHANNEL CODING
In this section we consider the fixed-rate universal wiretap channel coding for any stationary memoryless channel µ Y Z|X , where an input distribution µ X is given and it is enough to know the upper bound of H(X|Y ) and the lower bound of I(X; Z) before constructing the code. It should be noted here that we have to know the sizes of X , Y, and Z in advance.
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respectively. It should be noted that ImB represents the set of all messages, R B represents the encoding rate of a confidential message.
We fix functions A, B, B, and a vector c ∈ X lA available for an encoder, a decoder, and an eavesdropper.
We construct a stochastic encoder and assume that the encoder uses a random sequence w ∈ X l B , which is generated uniformly at random and independently of the channel and the message m ∈ X lB . We define the same encoder and decoder as defined in the last section except to replace and g A by g A defined by (3).
Let M and W be random variables corresponding to m and w, respectively, where the probability distributions p M and p W are given by (14) and (15), respectively. The decoding error probability Error Y |X (A, B, B, c) and the information leakage Leakage Z|X (A, B, B, c) are given by (16) and (17), respectively.
We have the following theorem. It should be noted that alphabets X and Y is allowed to be non-binary, and the channel is allowed to be asymmetric. have a hash property. Let µ X be the distribution of the channel input satisfying
where R B represents the encoding rate of a confidential message. Then for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B ∈ B, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
for any stationary memoryless channel µ Y Z|X satisfying
Remark 1: It should be noted that (21), (24), and (25) imply
VI. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT FROM CORRELATED SOURCE OUTPUTS
In this section we construct codes for secret key agreement from the correlated source outputs (X, Y, Z)
introduced in [12] (see Fig. 2 ), where a sender, a receiver, and an eavesdropper have access to X, Y , and Z, respectively. The secret key capacity, which represents the optimal key generation rate, is given in [17] as
where the supremum is taken over all n, t, and protocols (C
represents the communication between the sender and the receiver via a public channel and finally the sender and the receiver generate X and Y , respectively. It should be noted that X = Y is allowed with high probability. According to [3] ) is close to the secret key capacity. In the following, we focus on the one way secret key agreement protocol. When secret key agreement is allowed to be one-way from the sender to the receiver, the forward secret key capacity is given in [1] by
where the maximum is taken over all random variables C and X that satisfy the Markov condition
then we can construct an optimal one-way secret key agreement protocol by applying the following protocol to the correlated source ( X, (Y, C), (Z, C)), which achieves the maximum on the right hand side of (27).
The following construction is based on [16] . We fix functions 
Then a secret key agreement protocol is described below (see Fig. 4 ).
Encoding: Let x ∈ X n be a sender's random sequence. The sender transmits c to a legitimate receiver via a public channel and generates a secret key by m, where c and m are defined as
respectively.
Decoding: Let y ∈ Y n be a receiver's random sequence, and c ≡ Ax be a codeword received from the sender via a public channel. The receiver generates a secret key by Bg A (c|y), where g A is defined by (2).
Let C and M be random variables corresponding to c and m defined by (28) and (29), respectively. The key generation rate is given by
The error probability of the secret key agreement is given by
The information leakage is given by
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
For given l A and l B , assume that ensembles (A, p A ) and (A × B, p AB ) have a hash property.
For all δ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there are ε A > 0 and functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ B and B ∈ B such that the above secret key agreement protocol satisfies
By assuming that random variables C and X attain the forward secret key capacity given by (27) and the sender sends message C via public channel before the protocol, the rate of the proposed secret key agreement protocol for correlated sources ( X, (Y, C), (Z, C)) is closed to the forward secret key capacity.
VII. UNIVERSAL SECRET KEY AGREEMENT FROM CORRELATED SOURCE OUTPUTS
In this section, we construct a fixed-rate universal secret key agreement scheme for any stationary memoryless sources (X, Y, Z), where it is enough to know the upper bound of H(X|Y ) and the lower bound of H(X|Z)
before constructing the code. It should be noted here that we have to know the sizes of X , Y, and Z in advance.
For a given R A , R B > 0, let p A and p B be ensembles of functions
We use the same secret key agreement protocol as that described in the last section except that we replace
The key generation rate Rate, the error probability Error XY (A, B), and the information leakage Leakage(A, B)
are defined by (30), (31), and (32), respectively.
Theorem 4:
For given R A and R B , assume that ensembles (A, p A ) and (A × B, p AB ) have a hash property.
For all δ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A and B ∈ B such that the above secret key agreement scheme satisfies
for any stationary memoryless source (X, Y, Z) satisfying
Remark 2: It should be noted that (39) and (40) imply
VIII. APPLYING LINEAR PROGRAMMING METHOD TO MINIMUM-DIVERGENCE ENCODER,
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD DECODER, AND MINIMUM-ENTROPY DECODER
In this section, we apply the linear programming method introduced by [9] [5] by assuming that X = Y = GF(2) and A, B, and B are linear functions (sparse matrices). It should be noted again that this method may not find integral solutions and we do not discuss the performance of the linear programming methods in this paper.
First, we construct the minimum-divergence encoder g AB B defined by (1) . The following construction is presented in [19] . We use the fact that the analysis of error probability in the proof of theorems is not changed if we replace the minimum-divergence encoder g AB B by
where U is defined by (76) which appears in Appendix C. Let
is realized by finding x ′ that satisfies Ax ′ = c, Next, we construct the maximum-likelihood decoder g A defined by (2) . The following construction is equivalent to [9] . The function g A is realized by
arg min
arg max
where x ′ and y are considered as real-valued vectors in
The above minimizations and maximizations are the linear programming problems because the condition Ax ′ = c can be represented by linear inequalities by using the technique of [9] .
April 12, 2010 DRAFT Finally, we construct the minimum-entropy decoder g A defined by (3) . The following construction is presented in [19] , which is based on the idea presented in [5] . The function g A can be realized as
x t,max ≡ arg max
The derivation of (44) is presented in [19, Appendix A] . We can use the linear programming method to obtain x t,min and x t,max because the constraint Ax ′ = c can be represented by linear inequalities by using the technique introduced in [9] . It should be noted that g A can be replaced by
by assuming that U defined by (76) or t defined by (41) is shared by the encoder and the decoder, where x t,min and x t,max are defined by (42) and (43), respectively.
IX. PROOF OF THEOREMS

A. Proof of Theorem 1
We use the following lemma which is proved in Appendix.
Lemma 4:
Let g AB (c, m|z) be defined as
Then, for all δ ′ > 0, all sufficiently small γ > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B ∈ B, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
Now we prove Theorem 1. The equality (18) has already been shown. Since g AB B (c, m, w) = g A (c|y)
for all c and w, the inequality (19) comes immediately from Lemma 4 by letting δ ′ < δ.
In the following we prove (20) . From Lemma 4 and Fano's inequality, we have
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8) .
Let x ≡ g AB B (c, m, w), X n ≡ g AB B (c, M, W ) and X be defined as
Then the probability distribution P XZ is given by
where the summation equals zero when x / ∈ X and the second equality comes from the fact that if x ∈ X then there is a unique pair (m, w) such that x = g AB B (c, m, w). From Lemma 15, we have
for x ∈ T X,γ and z ∈ T Z|X,γ (x). Then the joint entropy H( X n , Z n ) is given by
for sufficiently large n, where the second inequality comes from (48) and (49), and the third inequality comes from Lemma 4. Then we have
for sufficiently large n, where the third equality comes from the fact that Bg(c, M, W ) = M , the first inequality comes from (47), the second inequality comes from (50), and we choose suitable ε B , γ, δ ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality we have (20) . April 
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B. Proof of Theorem 2
We use the following lemmas, which are proved in Appendix.
Lemma 5:
If I(X; Z) ≤ R, then for all ε > 0 there is a random variable Z taking values in Z ≡ X × Z and a function f such that
Lemma 6: Let g AB (c, m| z) be defined as
Then, for all δ ′ > 0, all sufficiently small γ > 0, and sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices)
A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B ∈ B, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
for any µ Y Z|X satisfying
Now we prove Theorem 2. The inequality (22) is shown similarly to the proof of (19) .
In the following we prove (23) . From Lemma 5, there is Z ∈ Z such that
where ε > 0 is specified later. From Lemma 6 and Fano's inequality, we have
for all δ ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8) . Similarly to the proof of (50), we have
where the second inequality comes from the fact that R B + R B < H(X) ≤ log |X |. Then we have
where the second inequality comes from (57) and M = Bg AB B (c, M, W ), the third inequality comes from (58), the fifth inequality comes from (56), and we choose a suitable γ > 0, a suitable ε > 0, and a suitable δ ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality, we have (23).
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 7:
Then, for any δ ′ > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A and B ∈ B such that
Now we prove Theorem 3.
First, we prove (34). Since g A (Ax|y) = x implies Bg A (Ax|y) = Bx, then the inequality (34) comes immediately from Lemma 7 by letting δ ′ < δ.
Next, we prove (35). From Lemma 7 and Fano's inequality, we have
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8) . This implies that
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where the equality comes from the definitions (28) and (29) of C and M . Then we have
where the second inequality comes from (61), the third inequality comes from the definitions (28) and (29) of C and M , and we choose a suitable ε A > 0 and a suitable δ ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality we have (35).
Finally, we prove (33). We have
where the second inequality comes from (61), and we choose a suitable ε A > 0 and a suitable δ ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality we have (33).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We use the following lemmas which are proved in Appendix.
Lemma 8: If H(X|Z) ≥ R, then for all ε > 0 there is a random variable Z taking values in Z ≡ X × Z
and a function f such that
Lemma 9: Let g AB (c, m| z) be defined as
for any µ XY Z satisfying
Now we prove Theorem 4. In the following, we prove (38) and (36). The proof of (37) is similar to that of (64).
First, from Lemma 8 and (66), there is Z ∈ Z such that
where ε > 0 is specified later. From Lemma 9 and Fano's inequality, we have
Next, we prove (38). We have
where the third inequality comes from (68), the fourth inequality comes from the definitions (28) and (29) of C and M , the second equality comes from (67) and we choose a suitable ε > 0 and a suitable δ ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality, we have (38).
Finally, we prove (36). We have
where the second inequality comes from (68), the equality comes from (67), and we choose a suitable ε > 0 and a suitable δ ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality, we have (36).
X. CONCLUSION
The constructions of codes for the wiretap channel and secret key agreement from correlated source outputs were presented. The optimality, reliability, and security of the codes were proved and the universal reliability and security were also proved. The proof of the theorems is based on the notion of a hash property for an ensemble of functions. Since an ensemble of sparse matrices has a hash property, we can construct codes by using sparse matrices and practical encoding and decoding methods are expected to be effective. We believe that our construction can be applied to a quantum channel to realize a quantum cryptography. However, it should be noted that the security criteria should be revised to the quantum version.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemmas
Before the proof of Lemmas 4 and 6, we prepare the following lemmas.
Lemma 10 ([18, Lemma 8]):
For any A and u ∈ U n ,
Lemma 11 ([18, Lemma 3]):
Lemma 12: Assume that ε B > ε A > 0. For β A satisfying lim n→∞ β A (n) = 0 and any γ > 0, there is a
for all sufficiently large n, where U is defined as
In the following, κ denotes κ(n).
Proof: Let
for every n. It is clear that κ satisfies (71) and (72). It is also clear that κ satisfies (73) when
for all sufficiently large n. This implies that κ satisfies (73). The inequality (74) comes from Lemma 21. From Lemma 21 and ε B > ε A > 0, we have
for all sufficiently large n. Then we have
for all sufficiently large n, where the first inequality comes from (74). This implies that there is T ⊂ T U ⊂ T X,γ such that
for all sufficiently large n.
Remark 3:
It should be noted that we can let ξ be arbitrarily large in (77) when β A (n) vanishes exponentially fast. This parameter ξ affects the upper bound of (46) and (52).
B. Proof of Lemma 4
In the following, we assume that ε A , ε B , and γ > 0 satisfy
Let κ ≡ {κ(n)} ∞ n=1 be a sequence satisfying (71)-(73), and U be defined by (76). Then (74) is satisfied for all γ > 0 and all sufficiently large n. From Lemma 12, there is T ⊂ T U ⊂ T X,γ satisfying (75).
Let x an input of the channel, and y and z be the channel outputs of the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Let m be a message and w be a random sequence. We define
Then the left hand side of (46) is upper bounded by
From Lemma 2 and (81), we have
for all δ ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where the last inequality comes from (71) and the properties (H2) and (H3) of an ensemble (A × B × B, p AB B ).
Next, we evaluate
. From Lemma 16, we have
for all δ ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
In the following, we assume that
From Lemma 14, we have (x, y) ∈ T XY,2γ and x ∈ T X|Y,2γ (y). Then there is
where the second inequality comes from Lemma 16. This implies that [G(y) \ {x}] ∩ C A (c) = ∅, where
Then we have
for all δ ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where the second inequality comes from Lemma 10, the fourth inequality comes from Lemma 11 and the fact that
the sixth inequality comes from (81), and the last inequality comes from (72), (82) and the properties (H1)- (H3) of an ensemble (A, p A ). Similarly, we have
Finally, from (83)- (88), we have the fact that for all δ ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n there are A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B ∈ B, and c ∈ ImA such that
C. Proof of Lemma 5
The following proof is based on [16, Lemma 1] . If there is a random variable X ′ taking values in X such that
for given (X, Z) and 0 ≤ R ′ ≤ H(X|Z) the lemma is proved by letting
The following proves the existence of X ′ satisfying (89). It is clear that 0 ≤ H(X|X ′ , Z) ≤ H(X|Z) for any
Since H(X|X ′ , Z) is a continuous function of the conditional distribution p X ′ |XZ , we have the existence of
D. Proof of Lemma 6
Let κ ≡ {κ(n)} ∞ n=1 be a sequence satisfying (71)-(73). Let U be defined by (76). Then (74) is satisfied for all γ > 0 and all sufficiently large n. From Lemma 12, there is T ⊂ T U ⊂ T X,γ satisfying (75).
We define
where we assume that n is large enough to satisfy T Z|X,γ (x) = ∅ for all x ∈ T X,γ . Then the left hand side of (22) is upper bounded by
. Similarly to the proof of (84), we have
Next, we evaluate
and assume that (x, y) ∈ T UV . Then we have
H(x ′ |y) ≤ H(x|y) and Ax
where | · | + is defined by (9) , the third equality comes from Lemma 10, and the second inequality comes from Lemma 20 and the property (H4) of (A, p A ). Let
where V |U denotes the conditional type given type U . Then we have
where the third inequality comes from Lemma 10 and (94), the fourth inequality comes from Lemmas 13 and 19, the fifth inequality comes from the definition of F Y |X and Lemma 18, and the last inequality comes from (81). Similarly, we have
From (91)-(93), (95) and (96), we have
where the infimum is taken over all µ Y Z|X satisfying (53)-(55). This implies that there are A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B ∈ B, and c ∈ ImA such that
Since
then the right hand side of (97) goes to zero as n → ∞ by assuming (71)-(73) and the properties (H2) and (H3) of ensembles (A, p A ), (A × B, p AB ) and (A × B × B, p AB B ).
E. Proof of Lemma 7
In the following, we assume that ε A > 0 and γ > 0 satisfy
Let x, y, and z be outputs of correlated sources. We define
Then the left hand side of (34) is upper bounded by 
Remark 4:
It should be noted that the property (H2) of ensembles (A, p A ) and (A×B, p AB ) can be replaced
respectively. In particular, there are expurgated ensembles (A, p A ) and (B, p B ) of sparse matrices that have an (α A , 0)-hash property, where the condition (H2) for α A and α AB is replaced by the above respective conditions (see [2] ).
F. Proof of Lemma 8
It has already been proved in the proof of Lemma 5 that there is a random variable X ′ taking values in X such that
for given (X, Z) and 0 ≤ R ′ ≤ H(X|Z). The lemma is proved by letting
f ( z) ≡ z for z = (x ′ , z).
G. Proof of Lemma 9
Let x, y, z be outputs of the correlated sources. We define
Then the left hand side of (64) 
where S i ≡ {(x, y, z) : (USKAi)} .
In the following, we evaluate E AB p XY Z (S c 1 ) and E AB p XY Z (S c 2 ) . Let U V be the type of sequence (x, y) ∈ X n ×Y n and V |U be the conditional type given type U . In the following, we assume that (x, y) ∈ T UV .
If g A (Ax|y) = x, then there is x ′ ∈ C A (Ax) such that x ′ = x and H(x ′ |y) ≤ H(x|y) ≤ H(U |V ). 
This implies that
where | · | + is defined by (9) , the second inequality comes from Lemma 1, and the third inequality comes from Lemma 20. Let 
where the first inequality comes from (105), the second inequality comes from Lemmas 13 and 19, and the last inequality comes from Lemma 18 and the definition of F XY . Similarly, we have
where 
H. Method of Types
We use the following lemmas for a set of typical sequences. If (u, v) ∈ T UV,γ , then u ∈ T U,γ and u ∈ T U|V,γ (v).
Lemma 15 ([22, Theorem 2.7][18, Lemma 24]):
Let 0 < γ ≤ 1/8. Then,
for all u ∈ T U,γ , and
for v ∈ T V,γ and u ∈ T U|V,γ ′ (v), where ζ U (γ) and ζ U |V (γ ′ |γ) are defined in (5) and (6) where η U (γ) is defined in (7).
